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ABSTRACT 
In tying together information learned in the Information Assurance program at 
Iowa State this paper goes over an introduction to malware, basic malware analysis, and 
setting up a manual malware analysis lab. Malware is malicious software that causes 
harm. The average malware will have 125 lines of code. Generally, malware consists of 3 
components: a concealer, a replicator, and a bomb. Malware is classified based on its 
nature and functionality. The 3 most common we see are viruses, worms, and Trojans. 
Malware generally falls into two categories based on its target: mass malware and 
targeted malware. Four general stages of malware analysis are manual code reversing, 
interactive behavior analysis, static properties analysis, and automated analysis. 
The paper goes over basic static and basic dynamic analysis. It briefly touches on 
advanced static and advanced dynamic analysis to cover 3 of the stages above. Sandboxes 
are covered and Cuckoo is talked about to cover automated analysis. 
Setting up a malware analysis lab is talked about as a physical lab or a virtual lab 
can be set up. Steps are given to use VMWare Workstation Pro to set up a manual 
malware analysis lab, getting a Microsoft Windows virtual machine, and installing 
Fireeye’s flare-vm on it. 
In closing, some work that can be expanded on and done in the future is 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION: DEFINE MALWARE 
The in studying malware, one of the most important first steps is understanding 
what malware is, what types are there, and how we can go about defining and relating 
malware. A short definition is malware is malicious software. A better version is “any 
software that does something that can causes harm to a user, computer, or network can be 
considered malware.” (Sikorski). The only piece I would tack on to that definition is with 
harm I would expand the definition to include having an adverse effect on a computer 
ecosystem by purposely using resources that it is not intended to. This would only be 
added as in today’s world there is malware going around that will try to install itself on 
various systems in order to crypto mine. Something like that infecting a company wouldn’t 
cause harm to a specific person, but could raise the cost of the servers through electricity, 
cooling costs, and CPU usage. Long term, it will likely have higher wear and tear on 
hardware as well. 
The next big question to answer about malware is how big is it? From quite a few 
studies done around 2005 up to 2010 seem to have their binaries of 125 lines of code. Size 
wise, from Sophos’ Naked Security blog they list “In January 2005 the average size of a 
malware sample was 126 kB. In June 2010 it is 338 kB.” Stuxnet by comparison had close 
to 15,000 lines of code. Sikorski’s book states that the GNOME text editor is built on 
gedit.c and all its files taken into count on its base version is over 70,000 lines of code. The 
reason that we bring this up is to point out that in comparison to most software we have 
and use, finding malware code is almost the digital equivalent of looking for a needle in a 
haystack; it is generally going to be vastly outnumbered by non-malicious code. 
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The next main question to answer is what are we looking for exactly and why 
analyze malware? The answer to this is a bit more anecdotal than we would typically like, 
but the answer more revolves around what are you trying to do with it. If you are a security 
analyst at a company, you might have a different answer that someone on the network 
security team, who will have a very different answer from someone who is a malware 
analyst for an anti-virus company. That being said, there are some commonalities to keep 
in mind while analyzing malware. These questions should be kept in the back of your mind 
as many will cross roles and help you plan your next step or steps in the analysis process.  
Some of the key general questions are going to be what does the malware do, what 
damage did it cause, what are indicators of compromise, what is the sophistication of the 
intruder, what vulnerability or exploit did they use, what network calls does it make, and 
has anyone seen this before? When we can find malwares purpose and goals, we can help 
classify the malware and identify the risk and potential attack vectors. When we determine 
the indicators of compromise we can help establish what it went after, what it could have 
gotten, and what we can do to reverse or revert any damage caused. This can also help with 
detecting the malware in your environment and determine who got infected to complete 
your impact analysis. For example, if the malware always makes a ‘tempDB.txt’ file and 
stores it in the AppData folder in Windows; you can start looking for this file to help detect 
the malware. This can also lead to helping us understand the sophistication of the attacker. 
120:1 Stuxnet to average malware 
300:1 Simple Text Editor to average malware 
2,000:1 Malware suite to average malware 
100,000:1 Defensive tool to average malware 
1,000,000:1 Target OS to average malware 
Figure 1.1 Found in Sikorski’s book in the forward on page xxii summarizing lines of 
code in average malware versus various other pieces of code and software. 
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These indicators can be harder to pick up on, but can help you determine if this is malware 
hitting anyone who is vulnerable, targeted at just your systems, and if it is targeted at your 
systems is it potentially insider information they are using to gain access? These will help 
figure out best approaches to take if/when you try to catch the intruder – though often 
times that part will be left up to your state and federal law enforcement agencies. From 
analyzing the malware you may find a specific vulnerability. This could be very specific to 
your systems if it is a sophisticated inside all the way to a published CVE that the script is 
using to take advantage of a missing patch. As far as looking at network calls it is making, 
this can help you classify the malware or determine if it is a bot net ‘phoning home’ – this 
will be discussed later in the paper. The last item on the list is has anyone seen this before. 
There are various information sharing and threat intelligence vectors that industries will 
use as well as public methods like twitter and news outlets that will share or link to details 
of malware. In addition to these, there are websites you can upload samples to that can 
share more details on if it has been seen before and which AVs potentially already detect 
it. The pros and cons to these sites will be discussed later in the paper. 
If you are working in a corporate environment, questions your business might want 
to know in addition to those listed above are what data was taken (and what regulations 
adhere to that lost data), how long has it been here, and how did it enter in the first place? 
With the first question, one of the key parts are any regulations in place around loss of data 
or potential loss of data. There are some laws and regulations that have timing 
requirements such as for notification of breaches. If it was something like a key logger, 
then there might be additional assessment that needs done outside of the malware to see if 
those credentials were used. Figuring out how long the malware has been around will help 
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determine scope and exposure to look for indicators of the malware and malicious behavior 
that could have occurred. Determining how and when malware got into the system will 
help companies try to find gaps in their current controls and potentially help with training 
efforts such as if it came in through a phishing campaign. 
The last set of questions to keep in mind are more technical in nature and 
explanations of them will follow later in the paper. Those questions are what network 
indicators can we find, what host-based indicators are around, is there a persistence 
mechanism, what is the date of compilation, what is the date of installation, what language 
is the code written in, what language is it compiled in, is the code packed, is the code 
obfuscated, is the code designed to thwart analysis, is the code designed to detect 
virtualization, and does the code have a rootkit?  
This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of questions to keep in mind, but rather to 
help with formation of notes and to ground the researcher with some of the items to be 
looking at in the malware. This paper will focus on Windows based malware as an 
introduction, but it should be noted at current state there is malware targeting macOS, 
tablets and mobile phones, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and even some focusing on 
crypto mining by going after large servers or local graphical processors. 
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CHAPTER 2.    STRUCTURE OF MALWARE 
As we get into malware analysis it starts to appear that there can be almost an 
infinite number of structures, types of malware, and setup to them. However, when we use 
statistics you will find most malware is not that bad to classify. So what are those 125 lines 
of code made out of? The more common breakdown you will find will have malware made 
out of 3 components: the replicator, the concealer, and the bomb. The replicator portion of 
the malware is what it is going to use to spread to other files or other systems. They can 
“spread via diskettes (and other exchangeable media), shared folders, network scans, peer-
to-peer networks or emails and instant messages.” (G DATA). The concealer may or may 
not be present depending on if it is a simple or complex virus. Some of the malware might 
have built in detection methods to use during replication to see if it is already present on 
that machine. The purpose of the concealer is to keep the virus from being detected. It can 
accomplish this in a variety of ways. They might detect if you are running a debugger, if 
malware is running, trying to be unpredictable by running at pseudorandom 
times/intervals, add a bunch of superfluous or obfuscated lines of code around their core 
pieces, spreading themselves out across multiple files, and occupying volatile memory to 
name a few. The third piece is the bomb. This is the main harmful component of the 
malware. It is the payload that runs an exploit, will exfiltrate data, cause a denial of 
service, disrupt the system memory, crash a system, and log your key presses to name a 
few scenarios. The bomb will let you see the damage area of the malware, and can help 
you gain insight on the true intent of the malware.  
While the malware researcher is looking at those 3 components of the malware, 
they will be able to attempt to classify it. Malware is often classified based on the nature 
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and functionality of the code. The 3 most common types of malware you will see are 
viruses, Trojans, and worms. Viruses are usually going to be described by their replicator 
code. A virus will rely on another program, often attaching itself to or piggy backing off of 
it. A Trojan will be classified based on the concealer and bomb code. The Trojan will 
usually conceal itself as a legitimate software, and its bomb logic will usually exfiltrate 
data. Worms will be classified by their replicator. They can often replicate themselves on 
their own. 
In addition to virus, Trojans, and worms, there are many types of additional 
malware. Some of the other classifications you might run across are rootkits, backdoors, 
spyware, adware, ransomeware, downloader, botnets, information stealing, 
launchare/launchware, scareware, spam-sending, and mining. Rootkits are a type of 
malware that is designed to gain root access on a machine. They are classified by their 
bomb code. Backdoor malware is classified by its bomb and partially its concealer. 
Backdoors are generally intended to try and install a way to bypass authentication, secure a 
connection, or obtaining access to plaintext. Spyware is malware that will monitor and 
track a user’s activity, browsing habits, keypresses, and any other data it can potentially 
use, exploit, or sell about the machine it is on. It is classified by its bomb code. Adware 
(sometimes also called malvertising) will try and display advertising banners while a 
program is running that generally might not show ads. Adware is categorized by its bomb 
code. Ransomware is classified by its bomb code. There are different variations, but 
ransomware will generally try to prevent access to a system or files (generally via 
encryption) and hold them ‘hostage’ until a ransom is paid. It should be noted that paying 
the ransom with this malware doesn’t guarantee that the victim will get the unlock keys or 
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gain access back to their system(s). Downloaders are very similar to Trojans and are 
mostly defined by their bomb. They will wait until an internet connection is established 
and try to download more files (often more malware). Botnets are a bit harder to describe 
than most of the examples. More commonly, they will be built on top of Trojans. Botnets 
are a group of infected computers (often called ‘bots’ or ‘zombies’) that will call home to a 
command and control (C&C) center for instructions and control. These can be telnet calls, 
IRC, P2P, and HTTP calls to name a few. These will be classified by their bomb code. 
Botnets can be used to distribute malware, email spam, bitcoin mining, spyware, and play 
a hand in sending out distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Information stealing 
malware is similar in behavior to spyware but is often times more targeted. It is classified 
by its bomb, but differs in nature of generally being more targeted. This could be set up to 
scrape volatile memory to grab payment information, only log keys, proprietary code or 
information, or screen scrapers to name a few. Launcher/launchare/launchware and loaders 
all refer to the same type of malware. It “is a type of malware that sets itself or another 
piece of malware for immediate or future covert execution. The goal of a launcher is to set 
up things so that the malicious behavior is concealed from a user.” (Sikorski). Scareware 
relies on social engineering to cause fear or shock to coerce a user to make a payment for a 
product or to try and blackmail a user. The product they buy may or may not be legitimate, 
and may or may not be needed. The blackmail threats are generally fake. This can be 
popups saying ‘your computer is infected by 1500 viruses, click here to remove them’ to 
software saying ‘we hacked your computer and know you visited insertname adult website, 
pay 1 bitcoin or we will release the video to everyone on your email list’. Scareware is 
often found via its bomb. Spam sending malware is malware that is classified by its bomb 
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and relies on infecting a machine or server and will try to send out spam or malicious 
emails. 
After having discussed the 3 components that make up most malware and talking 
over a few classifications, it should be mentioned that the classifications are not mutually 
exclusive. You will often find some combined or chained together. For example, spyware 
may have a downloader as well to help download other malware. 
In addition to classifying malware by its nature and functionality, we can classify it 
based off of its target. The two main types are mall malware and targeted malware. Mass 
malware has been described as the ‘shotgun’ approach to malware – its goal is to affect as 
many machines as possible. Mass malware is the more common of the two types. It is the 
easiest to detect and in most cases will be less sophisticated than targeted malware. 
Targeted malware will usually be designed and tailored to a specific organization, 
company, or software. Anti-virus programs will often times not detect these as they won’t 
be as widespread. That being said, they may reuse components of known malware and the 
anti-virus software may pick up on those signatures. These will generally be more 
sophisticated and rely on advanced analysis. Because they are more targeted and harder to 
detect they are generally going to be more of a security threat. 
In addition to the above classifications, malware is sometimes also detected and 
classified via host-based signatures; trying to detect it on the victim’s computer. Network 
signatures can also sometimes detect malware by monitoring traffic. There are cases of an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) picking up on malicious traffic. 
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CHAPTER 3.    MALWARE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
Even though most malware is only 125 lines of code, it is very complex. Even in 
software development having access to all of the source code it can be daunting to figure 
out what a program is actually doing. With software development, developers will usually 
follow a process like the software development life cycle (SDLC). A penetration tester 
might follow a process or framework like the Attack Kill Chain – more specifically its 
lateral movement cycle. With malware analysis, a researcher will similarly want to use a 
systematic approach. The 4 general stages of malware analysis are manual code reversing, 
interactive behavior analysis, static properties analysis, and automated analysis. 
Manual code reversing is related to manually analyzing the code and potentially 
reverse engineering the code. This will often be viewing the assembly code, trying to 
decode stored data, reviewing the logic of the program, and helping to understand the 
capabilities of the malware. A lot of this will also encompass advanced static analysis 
techniques, and some advanced dynamic analysis techniques. 
Static properties analysis will cover basic and advanced static analysis. This 
process is very similar to static analysis of software development where a developer might 
scan their source code for bugs, vulnerabilities in 3rd party dependencies, and code quality 
to name a few. This will be reviewing the malware without actually running it. In another 
analogy, this can be related to an autopsy of the code – dissecting the ‘dead’ code. In doing 
this, the researcher is looking for what the code needs, what resources it is taking 
advantage of, can we decompile the code, any static PE properties, any system calls, any 
interesting strings, and any dynamic link libraries (DLLs) that the code is using. More on 
these later. 
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Interactive behavior analysis, also called dynamic analysis involves observing the 
malware running live. In software development this would be similar to using tools like 
Selenium, OWASP ZAP, or Burp Suite. It has even been related to the ant farms that have 
glass on both sides you can see the tunnels the ants dig – it involves trying to set up an 
environment where you can observe the malware. Dynamic analysis will include 
monitoring network traffic, file system modification, registry analysis, and memory 
analysis. There is basic dynamic analysis that involves running malware on a system to 
observe behavior. This does not require deep programming knowledge. However advanced 
dynamic analysis may involve a bit more programming knowledge and usually revolves 
around using debuggers to analyze what the malware is doing. 
The fourth stage mentioned is automated analysis. Automated analysis involves 
having an environment set up that can automatically do this analysis. There are commercial 
tools like VXstream that you can just drag and drop files into or detonate files in and view 
what interactions they have. There is open source software as well like cuckoo that can be 
set up to automate it. When we go back to looking at the comparisons mentioned above, 
125 lines of malicious code in 70,000 lines of code for a text editor is potentially very hard 
to spot. Keep in mind that there is a lot of software as well that doesn’t have malware in it. 
This is why what a malware analyst is looking for is often referred to as a ‘sample’ instead 
of malware – as it might be clean software. 
From this split, we have 4 categories that we can hit. True positive, false positive, 
true negative, and false negative. In this case, a true positive will be a sample has malware, 
and the automated tool alerted us that it did. A false positive would be a sample did not 
have malware, and our automated tool told us it did. A false negative would be it had 
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malware, but the automated tool did not alert us that it did. A true negative would be the 
sample did not contain malware, and the automated tool did not alert us that it did. With an 
automated tool, the goal would be to analyze those 4 categories and try and tweak 
thresholds and scans to try and have the highest amount of true positives and true negatives 
while trying to keep false positives and false negatives lower. Analyzing one piece of 
software at a time works in some cases; but for bigger companies that might exchange 
millions of files a day there are two options with fighting malware: hire tons and tons of 
malware analysts, or put automation into place and have the malware analysts investigate 
the true positives that the tool alerts on. 
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CHAPTER 4.    MANUAL LAB ENVIRONMENT 
One of the most important decisions to make is what kind of and how an analyst 
will set up their malware analysis lab, also sometimes called a sandbox. There are two 
main approaches, physical devices (usually personal computers (PCs), tablets, or actual 
cell phones), and virtual machines (VMs). The approach that you go will depend on your 
end goal, budget, and amount of space that you have. 
With a physical lab, you would need a device running whichever operating system 
or environment you were wanting to test. This could be a car with the OS and version 
running on it, each cell phone needed (iPhone for each version you want to test, various 
android versions), or a set of multiple personal computers. This can cost a lot, and take up 
a lot of space. In addition to this, the researcher will want to configure a network that is 
isolated for the devices to use depending on which category of malware they are studying. 
Since this paper focuses on Windows, then using the above the lab the researcher 
would set up would involve one or more personal computers. Getting each machine to 
have the same operating system, all the patches to the point we need, and then get baselines 
of them can be time consuming. There are tools that can be used like Truman to help 
automate re-imaging of machines. Another option is to get hard disk drive (HDD) write 
cache cards to help with this. 
The pros of this type of lab environment is that it is more realistic – the researcher 
will get to see what the sample does on the actual hardware in the actual environment. The 
cons are it can cost more, take up more space, and take up more time. 
The alternative to this that is increasing in popularity is the use of virtual machines. 
With virtual machines there are a lot of free options that can be used. There are lots of 
13 
operating systems that have virtual machine editions that can be simulated. Some of the 
potential programs are VMWare, Parallels, Xen, and Microsoft Virtual PC. A few of these 
such as VMWare support the idea of taking a snapshot. 
A VMWare snapshot will basically take an image of the time the computer is at. 
When the researcher restores to this point, everything that was done after it will be gone – 
all new files created, all registry changes, all text files, all system file changes, etc. It will 
be as if none of it happened. It should be pointed out this is very different from a Windows 
System restore. A system restore will generally just restore system files to a previous state. 
This means if there was a Microsoft Word document with malware – it would generally 
not be touched by a system restore. 
For added protection, while a researcher is doing static analysis, they can use a 
different operating system that the one they believe the malware is targeting to start their 
analysis. This can help prevent an accidental double click of the file. 
Though virtual machines have many pros such as only needing one personal 
computer or server to run on (assuming it has enough resources), being cheaper, and faster 
to load/restore, there are some drawbacks to using a virtual machine. One of the first is it 
can be nontrivial to set up and configure the network side of them. Doing one virtual 
machine at a time it is usually recommended to configure it for a host only network. 
Depending on the needs, a researcher can also configure them for virtual networks. The 
second drawback to keep in mind is that virtual machines are not bullet proof. There are 
simple built in commands a user can run such as ‘wmic bios get serial number’ that will 
display a serial number on a normal version of Windows, but will display 0 on most virtual 
machines. There are open source tools built that a researcher can run to determine how 
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easy/hard it is to detect that a virtual machine is running, and give clues and hints on what 
can be done to make it harder to determine it is in fact running in a virtual machine. That 
being said, it is a double edged sword. An attacker that is sophisticated that is not wanting 
to target malware can potentially use these same tools to try and help their malware get 
around them. Some malware will detect it is running in a virtual machine and do nothing, 
or act differently. That being said, there are some companies that each user logs into a 
virtual machine to work as it is easier to license and monitor software in a virtual machine 
for the company than to monitor physical machines – so the malware may not care if it is 
in a virtual machine. Virtual machines can have flaws and bugs in their software as well 
which can help or hurt in analysis. One of the other big flaws with this is that the virtual 
machine software itself such as VMWare can potentially have 0 day exploits in them. In 
addition to those and other flaws, it is possible for malware to jump outside of its virtual 
machine and infect the host machine. A 0-day worm that can exploit listening service on a 
host operation system will escape the sandbox. 
In addition to setting up the environment, it was briefly mentioned about setting up 
a networking environment for it. This is an area of debate and what state the researcher is 
in should help decide this information. Connections can be opened up for certain network 
traffic (such as hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to help install certain tools, ports to 
allow windows and software updates, and file transfer protocol (FTP) ports to get the 
sample file on the machine). However, when performing the analysis, the network should 
generally be closed off. Often it is referred to as ‘calling home’ or ‘phoning home’ if the 
sample be analyzed is in a certain category. Letting the malware call home can make 
figuring out what it is doing a lot easier as it will behave normally. That being said, it 
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might give the attacker the address of the machine it is running on (which can make that 
computer the target of additional attacks). This can potentially accidently enter you into a 
real time battle if the machine pops an exploit and connects to a control server. Because of 
this risks, it is generally advised to keep the network isolated and create ‘in house’ services 
to respond to the calls home. If a researcher knows what they are doing, a potentially safer 
route in letting it actually call home may be to connect the gateway of the service to an 
anonymized network such as the onion relay (also known as the onion router and TOR). 
At the time of writing this paper, students at Iowa State should have free access to 
the professional version of VMWare which will allow them to set up a lab at home, and in 
the future potentially be able to take these same virtual machines and set them up on 
ISEAGE for students to do basic malware analysis. 
Setting up the Lab 
The current place to start would be to make sure the host operating system is fully 
up to date. Check and double-check everything is patched with the latest firmware and 
software. The current address for Students is https://cytools.iastate.edu/vmap/. This should 
prompt for a SAML login and then connect to a onthehub.com website where students can 
get various software. At the time of writing, the latest version of VMWare Workstation 
Professional edition on there is 15. 
Once that software is installed, the next step is to get a Windows operating system 
image to install in VMWare. Again, there are ways to emulate iOS and Android – but these 
are out of scope for this introduction to malware analysis. That being said, with the amount 
of phones and tablets coming out and gaining popularity, it is a growing area and gaining 
lots of market share; especially with the internet of things devices as well. Keep in mind 
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what attackers are wanting to go after and their various methods. If they are going for easy 
money and doing the mass malware or shotgun approach; they will look at what has the 
highest market share and go after that. For Microsoft, you can Google it; but 
https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/tools/vms/ is the current location to 
download a free VM to test malware with. You can select operating systems based on 
which browser you would like. This is allowed and legal. It should be noted some sites that 
a person visits to learn more about malware analysis will recommend torrenting a version 
of Windows that is cracked and has a ‘valid’ product key. A majority of those methods are 
illegal – and potentially contain malware. The only big operating system the above site is 
missing in the Windows suite is Windows XP. The above site will only have supported 
versions of Windows and XP was ‘end of life’ed (no longer supported) April 8th, 2014. 
Malware like WannaCry and Petya are relatively recent and did in fact target Windows 
XP. Note that in figure 1 the VMs expire after 90 days, and what it says their password is 
for initial use. Over time the password will change, so do not rely on figure 1. As of my 
latest check September 1st, 2018 on https://www.statista.com/statistics/218089/global-
market-share-of-windows-7/ Windows made up 82.45% of desktop OS market share and 
MacOSX was 12.89%; so this should cover over 95% of users and most of our students. 
 
Figure 4.1 Important note on Microsoft’s website on password for the virtual machine 
and when the image expires. 
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The author has not used nor tested it, but there is VMWare Horizon for Chromebooks that 
is supposed to be very similar to VMWare Workstation to help cover some of that 
remaining 5% of users. At last check, the Windows OS download was 4.5 gigabytes (GB) 
in size; so this can take some time to download depending on your connection speeds. 
The book Practical Malware Analysis lists a ton of great tools on page 465. Finding 
the tools individually yourself can actually take quite some time to locate and install. 
However, the company FireEye created flare-vm, a package that contains a lot of common 
malware analysis tools; most of which are listed in the book; and a few that are not. This is 
by far the easiest add on to use to gather all the tools to use for manual analysis. If a 
researcher is wanting to mimic their production environment, flare-vm might not be the 
best approach; but for the purposes of beginning malware analysis, this makes a great tool. 
 
Figure 4.2 Screenshot of the flare-vm background and taking a snapshot in VMWare 
Workstation Pro 
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Once you have downloaded the Windows virtual machine and installed it, boot it up and 
login. Open Internet Explorer (note if you are using Windows 10 you want to make sure 
you are using Internet Explorer and not Edge), and go to 
http://boxstarter.org/package/url?https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fireeye/flare-
vm/master/flarevm_malware.ps1. Select Internet Explorer if it prompts you on how/what 
to open the file with. When the download is completed, click run. Note what the default 
Figure 4.3 Screenshot of VMWare Workstation Virtual Machine Settings, highlighting 
setting the network to Host-only. 
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Windows background looks like. We will know flare-vm install is done once that changes. 
The author stopped watching during this process, but the virtual machine will restart 
multiple times as it installs new tools, and took a little over 4 hours to install. You will 
know the process is completed when it says ‘Type ENTER to exit’ and the background is a 
flare-vm one, as seen in figure 2. At this point, you will want to open the virtual machine 
settings and click on ‘Network Adapter’ and set it to Host only as seen in figure 3. The 
next step at this point is to take a snapshot. You will want to go to the menu at the top, 
click VM, then Snapshot, then new snapshot. You will want to name this appropriately, 
such as ‘PostVMWareInstall’ or ‘Baseline’. At this point, you are done setting up your 
virtual machine and have taken a snapshot. You can take more snapshots as time goes on if 
you ever want to go back to them such as ‘postSampleRun1’. 
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CHAPTER 5.    STATIC ANALYSIS 
Again in quick summary, static analysis is where we will be figuring out anything 
we can about the sample before actually running it. Most malware samples will be 
provided to you in a compressed format, and renamed. The common password to open a 
file is “infected” without quotes. Most will use 7zip to compress them. A lot of times, the 
samples that are found are in a lab environment with their extension renamed, such as 
renaming an executable files to .exe1 instead of its standard .exe. This is to prevent 
accidental double clicking and running the sample. In a production environment that may 
exist at a company, this may not be the case so the researcher would want to exercise extra 
caution. A researcher can search the internet for collections of samples to view. Upon 
searching, some potential candidates on GitHub are: 
 https://github.com/mikesiko/PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs 
 https://github.com/fabrimagic72/malware-samples 
 https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo 
 https://github.com/InQuest/malware-samples 
 https://github.com/rshipp/awesome-malware-analysis 
Since the author used Practical Malware Analysis as a main source, most of my examples 
will use samples from their collection. Static Analysis is a great starting point as it can help 
a researcher learn a bit more information about the sample that they can use to augment, 
add to, or tweak their environment with. 
Basic Static Analysis 
For basic static analysis, we will go over anti-virus (AV) scanning, hashing, strings, 
packed/obfuscated code, portable executable (PE) files and headers, and libraries. 
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For anti-virus scanning, one of the first steps a researcher can do is to scan the file 
with an anti-virus program and see if there are any results. If it is a malware sample from 
one of the locations listed above, chances are very high that it is in quite a few anti-virus 
programs; Windows might have even detected it as the file was transferred over and 
unzipped with its built in program. For a new researcher, this is a great starting point as the 
anti-virus program might give hints to what category the sample contains, such as Trojan 
or key logger. Another popular tool is to upload the sample to VirusTotal. VirusTotal will 
scan files and uniform resource locators (URLs) with, at the time of this writing, over 70 
anti-virus scanners, then display the results. This is a great resource to use, and sometimes 
users will even leave comments on samples that can be helpful. However, VirusTotal has 
two big cons to be aware of. The first is that VirusTotal is public – if you upload a sample 
that hasn’t been seen before, the writer of the malware may be able to see this and see you 
are investigating their malware. The second, is that paying customers can download the 
uploaded samples to do research with. This means if you have a lot of personably 
identifiable information - such as an excel file with customer first names, last names, social 
security numbers, addresses, and date of births – and upload this to VirusTotal as you think 
it contains malware; a paid customer can potentially download that file. This will generally 
be considered a loss of customer data for the researcher and potentially cause extra work. 
Because of this, always think twice about what you are uploading and if it should be 
uploaded so that data is not made public that shouldn’t be. 
Often times, you can get MD5 checksums or hashes of the file and upload those to 
sites to check as well, or sub portions of the file. The other side to hashing will be to set a 
baseline of pieces of information while you do dynamic analysis. However, in this context 
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we are talking about using hashing to fingerprint the samples and other files. By doing this, 
it gives common ground to verify other researchers are talking about the same file/sample. 
Also, if you have malware that manipulates a text file to add data to it for example, taking 
a hash of the file at the current time, then hashing it after running the malware you will see 
a difference in the hashes. Thus the hashes can be used to quickly identify differences. A 
free tool to do this is md5deep. A researcher would just run the command ‘md5deep 
C:\path\to\file.exe’ without quotes. There are graphical user interface (GUI) versions as 
well. 
Strings in malware are what you would expect a string to be in programming. They 
are a sequence of characters. “A program contains strings if it prints a message, connects to 
a URL, or copies a file to a specific location.” (Sikorski). A researcher can run strings on a 
file by using the command ‘strings filename.exe’ (and you can use ‘> output.txt’ on the 
end to output the results to a text file; helpful with a lot of the command line programs) 
without quotes. Strings can be hit or miss on it. It may have a lot of strings that mean 
nothing such as ‘M{C’, but can have very helpful information. Sometimes the output can 
be calls from a Windows library such as ‘GetLayout’ or ‘SetLayout.’ They can also be 
dynamic link library (DLL) names, such as ‘GDI32.DLL.’ An analyst can use some of 
these DLLs to determine what the program might be doing. One example is if a program 
uses Wininet.dll, this library is sometimes used to do FTP, HTTP, or NTP. If this DLL 
shows up in a program that shouldn’t be connecting to the network; it can be a sign that it 
may be trying to exfiltrate data or receive a file. Another item a researcher might find in 
strings are hardcoded internet protocol (IP) addresses. Finding one or more of these can 
help a researcher set up a lab environment where it responds to the malware when it tries to 
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send information. One final item that may be found in strings are error messages. The 
example Sikorski uses is if there is a string stating there is a missing mail system DLL, this 
can mean the sample is trying to use a mail DLL to send emails. This could be in a key 
logger for example, to send the information out once it is collected. 
If strings doesn’t seem to yield any results, this is a potential indicator that the 
sample is packed or obfuscated. Packed code will usually have a wrapping program that 
can unpack the code. This may still use some Windows DLLs to do this. This is one way 
malware can try to hide from anti-virus programs, as strings are not visible in the packed 
portion of the executable. PEiD is a common tool that can be used to view what program 
was used to pack the executable, when it was packed, and other information about the 
program. If this tool or a similar one works, a researcher can attempt to download that 
same packing program and unpack the sample. Once it is unpacked, they can go back a 
step and retry running it through an AV scanner, then hashing it, then running strings on it. 
Portable Executable (PE) is a data structure format that executables (.exe) use in 
Windows and contain the runnable code and a list of DLLs. There are 3 ways to link the 
DLLs; static, runtime, and dynamic. Static linking imports the code itself from the DLL. 
This is not common in Windows, but is with some UNIX and Linux programs. One 
downside to this is that the used code library is copied in, making it hard to differentiate 
between the original code and imported libraries. Another is it can increase the file size of 
the executable. With dynamic linking, the code will load all the linked libraries when the 
file first loads. Think of this like doing role call before starting a project – the manager is 
making sure everyone is there before they start work. This is most common, as the 
program stays a smaller size, and can determine it is missing libraries before trying to run 
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and crashing. Runtime linking is more common in malware, and it will not attempt to load 
a library until it calls it in the code. One program to explore dynamic linked libraries is 
Dependency Walker. This program can be downloaded, but is also sometimes included 
with some development kits in windows, such as Microsoft Visual Studio. Dependency 
Walker will allow a researcher to view the executable, each dynamic linked library, and 
each function call within the DLL that is referenced. In addition, it will often list versions 
of the linked DLL and can show timestamps of, checksums, entry points, assembly 
architecture, and other helpful information. One helpful callout in Sikorski’s book is 
naming conventions in Windows. Be sure to search around online when researching them 
as there are some things that can be confusing. One example is a function name listed in 
Dependency Walker might have a W or A at the end, but doesn’t in their online 
documentation. This just indicates that the one ending in an ‘A’ takes ASCII arguments 
and the one ending in a ‘W’ takes a string. Also, they can end with an ‘Ex’ to indicate it is 
not backwards compatible, and this is the new call. An example would be CreateWindow 
versus CreateWindowEx. Another tool that can be helpful is PEview. With PEView, a 
researcher can view more information about the headers including some of the .text, .data, 
.rdata, and .rsrc sections. The big take away with this tool is often times if you can view 
the virtual size and size of raw data they should be roughly close. If they are not, that is 
usually an indicator that something is amiss. 
Using the static analysis techniques described above, a researcher can start to 
understand functions the code may use, potential IP addresses it will reach out to, 
potentially when it was created, and some basic header information. At this point, they 
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could use other tools like Yara to write rules to detect the sample based on some of the 
information they have gathered. 
Advanced Static Analysis 
Advances static analysis is partially out of scope for this paper as it covers a lot of 
topics and can go quite in depth. At a brief high level, some of the items in advanced static 
analysis are disassembling the code, Windows registry, Windows API, code constructs, 
networking APIs, following malware, and using IDA Pro. 
There is an entire course at Iowa State on reverse engineering that the author has 
not been lucky enough to take. From the description it is believed the course would hit on 
disassembling the code, some debugging, and IDA Pro usage. From that, learning 
assembly from scratch can seem like a daunting task and can be quite different than high 
level programming languages that might be more common to software developers. 
However, knowing a lot of the code constructs can help follow and understand assembly. 
Examples are for loops, while loops, if statements, nested if statements, function call 
statements, and jumps. Interactive Disassembler (IDA) Pro is a unique tool that can be 
used for debugging, static property analysis, and decompiling code. There are also plugins 
to help it support many languages. It even has a graphical mode a user can go into where it 
maps out the program flow and calls. A similar tool to this mapping would be Binary 
Ninja. The flow and mapping can help a researcher figure out what is going on, especially 
if they have a bit weaker assembly programming skillset. 
Windows registry stores a lot of variables, information, and settings for programs, 
hardware devices, user preferences, and the operating system to name a few. Some 
malware may target going after the registry for various reasons. A main reason may be to 
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set the malware to run automatically. The registry could also be tweaked to point to 
different executable files when performing certain functions. From this, when looking 
through strings, disassembled code, or debugging code, look for calls like ‘HKLM’, 
‘RegOpenKeyEx’, or ‘RegSetValueEx.’ These changes can be damaging and even 
removing malware often time’s registry settings are not reversed which can cause crashes 
farther down the road. 
Windows has an API within it that can allow a program do tons of different 
functions. For better or worse, the API is so huge that there is little need for 3rd party 
extensions of it. This means programs interacting with it will use a defined set of names. 
The Windows API can allow a program to access the Windows Registry mentioned above, 
create files, read files, write to files, display values to a window, access network 
functionality, and access shared files to name a few functions. Becoming familiar with 
some of the API calls can help find relevant strings and help figure out what calls are being 
made when disassembling code. 
The networking API mentioned above is how most Windows based malware will 
connect to the network. The networking API allows programs to open sockets, open 
connections, send data, receive data, accept connections, and listen on a socket to name a 
few. Finding these calls can allow a researcher a better chance at narrowing in on 
malicious traffic and potentially spoofing responses to see how the sample will react. 
Though we have touched on a lot of advanced static analysis at a high level, it 
should be noted that a researcher will still need to keep in mind what they are researching. 
For example, researching the calculator on Windows (calc.exe), it may not need to connect 
to the internet at all; so finding network calls could be a sign of compromise. However, it 
27 
may have help documents that do connect to the internet to download the latest version of 
their text, or to link to an online knowledge base. When looking at Windows native 
notepad versus Notepad++, Notepad++ will have a lot more connection based code for it to 
check for updates, have a plugin manager enabled, and connect to a plugin store. It will 
also need to download plugins for itself. This means that in manually researching a sample, 
keep in mind what all the program can and is capable of doing to not take a path that could 
lead nowhere. There will be times where finding this information leads to finding out more 
about those 125 lines of code in the malware sample, and many more that lead to 
investigating functionality of a program that was intended to be there and used in that way. 
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CHAPTER 6.    DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
Dynamic analysis is performing analysis during or after a sample has been run. 
This is part of the interactive behavior analysis. Dynamic analysis will rely on some pieces 
that are set up and learned in the static analysis portion. It can be broken into basic 
dynamic analysis and advanced dynamic analysis. Advanced dynamic analysis will rely 
mostly on debugging and bleed over into some of the manual code reversing category. 
Basic Dynamic Analysis 
Basic dynamic analysis will consist of monitoring processes, will rely on a sandbox 
environment (which is the virtual machine environment set up in chapter 4), can use an 
external sandbox environment, compare registry snapshots, faking a network, and packet 
sniffing. 
For process monitoring in Windows, one of the go to tools would be ProcMon. It 
was built to combine two tools that are no longer supported, RegMon and FileMon. To use 
ProcMon a researcher would simply launch the program, then click File then Capture 
Events and it will start. They would then double click on the sample or use command 
prompt to run it. Generally the researcher would want to wait some time before stopping 
the capture as some malware will not react right away. The output could be exported if 
desired. The output can also be filtered to better see what is going on. Though ProcMon 
can be used to monitor some network activity as well, it is not recommended to use the 
tool for that. There are inconsistencies between versions of Windows, and other tools that 
are better suited for that. Procmon will show sequence, time, process name, pat, operation, 
and result which can be helpful in tracking down what ran. Using its filter you can study 
registry changes to see how it installs itself and file system changes to see what files it 
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modified, created, or deleted. In addition, you can view process activity to see if the 
spawned different or additional processes. Lastly, filtering on networking may allow the 
researcher to see what calls were made or open ports. Another tool to use is Process 
Explorer. This is a Microsoft tool. One key feature is to watch this and see what process 
IDs (PIDs) show up that are new. Another useful feature of this tool is to verify if a piece 
is signed by Microsoft. This will check the on disc file though and not what is loaded and 
ran in volatile memory. 
Sandbox wise, a researcher can use their VMWare environment to run, rerun, and 
take snapshots of before and after a sample was run. In addition to those, there are websites 
that have sandboxes set up, and commercial tools that spin up sandboxes to detonate 
samples in. There are a few drawbacks to these. The first is that a researcher has to be 
willing to upload these samples to a website if they are going after free services (such as 
Norman SandBox or GFI Sandbox). This runs into the same problem with VirusTotal 
where if there is company confidential information in the sample, it might not be the best 
idea to upload it. Another drawback is they will simply run the executable or open the file 
– so command line arguments cannot be specified. They do, however, provide an 
organized report that can be useful and used for initially getting a bearing on what the 
sample does. The output report may include things like behavior traits, mutexes, registry 
activity, network activity, and virus total results. Another drawback is some sites might not 
let you pick the operating system the sample runs in – so if the sample only works in 
Windows 7 but it runs it in Windows 10 a researcher might not get accurate results. The 
sandbox also might run too fast to allow it to properly detect the sample to unpack itself, 
download and install its required components, then run.  
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Registry snapshots are another helpful piece in analyzing a sample. Using a tool 
like Regshot, a researcher can simply open the tool and hit the first shot button. This will 
capture the registry and get any relevant information. The researcher would then run the 
sample, and click the second shot button, then the compare button. This comparison can be 
exported if needed. Generally, these snapshots will be used in addition to a tool like 
ProcMon to piece together what changes are being made. 
Faking a network can be very beneficial in figuring out what calls a sample is 
making and what information it is trying to gleam. The tools mentions next can be 
configured and run on the same local virtual machine instance that a researcher is testing a 
sample on. Some malware may be built to detect this, so a potential safer approach is to set 
up this network on a different machine and configure your network accordingly. The first 
tool to use is ApateDNS. This tool will listen on UDP 53 on local machine by default and 
if it is configured will spoof domain name system (DNS) responses. Running locally the 
researcher will have easy instant access to the GUI to view requests. Another tool that can 
be used and setup is INetSim. INetSim is Linux based, but will simulate a lot of common 
internet services. These can include DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC, ECHO, and SMTP. Another 
tool to use is netcat. If a researcher can figure out what calls the sample is making, they can 
use a slew of simple netcat commands to set up listening or setting up inbound and 
outbound connections. However, be cognizant of the machine you are running netcat on. If 
you are analyzing malware such as a worm and allow it to connect to a machine not in your 
safe network via netcat you can accidently spread the malware. 
The final piece of basic dynamic analysis is sniffing network traffic with a network 
sniffer. Though there are a few, the most common go to will be Wireshark. This can be 
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done by running Wireshark locally on the virtual machine, or setting it up on a different 
machine running one of the other network simulated services. It should be noted that if it is 
running on the same machine the sample it on, the sample may detect this and not work, or 
try to run a Wireshark exploit. 
It is worth calling out in Sikorski’s book they recommend when doing basic 
dynamic analysis to run ProcMon, set a filter on the sample executable, start process 
explorer, use Regshot’s first shot button, set up the virtual network and sniffing/logging, 
then run the sample. After this, the researcher can finish up the capture process with each 
tool and export any reports needed and start going through results. This can help save time 
when analyzing the sample. 
Advanced Dynamic Analysis 
Advanced dynamic analysis generally consists of debugging the sample. It is 
partially out of scope for beginners with malware analysis, but it will be reviewed at a high 
level. There are source level and assembly level debuggers. Most of the debugging done 
for malware analysis will be assembly level debugging. It will require decent knowledge of 
assembly. Though debugging sounds simple, it is no small feat to master. There is stepping 
over code versus stepping into code. Setting breakpoints, exceptions, modifying execution, 
using the right debugger, and being able to understand what the code is doing. One 
common tool that may be used if it is x86 assembly code is OllyDbg. OllyDbg has a lot of 
features it is capable of, some of which being a 4 panel interface, memory map, conditional 
breakpoints, loadings DLLs, tracing, exception handling, patching, and plugins. Another 
popular tool that would be used for this is WinDbg. This is a free Microsoft made 
debugger. Sikorski’s book states that OllyDbg us more popular for most assembly 
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debugging, but that WinDbg has the advantage when it comes to kernel debugging and 
rootkit analysis. 
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CHAPTER 7.    AUTOMATED ANALYSIS 
Though some sandboxes were mentioned in the dynamic analysis section, it should 
be noted that there are some sandboxes that can be purchased for companies to use on 
premise. One popular open source one however is Cuckoo Sandbox. The details of its 
installation will not be gone over as it is slightly more than 40 steps depending on which 
path is taken (https://cuckoo.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation/). It can be hosted on 
Windows, Mac, or Linux. It does have a few dependencies required on the host machine. 
Once those are installed, it then needs a guest machine VM setup with a guest OS and 
needs to be configured with a username and password. Once everything is configured, 
there is a local web interface that can be used to upload a file to. Cuckoo will then take the 
file, spin up the guest VM, detonate the file, and output the report. This is something that 
could be set up and integrated in with ISEAGE as well if desired – but the free capabilities 
seem to cover potential needs for now. A piece that is worth calling out about these tools 
however, is that some companies have started integrating APIs on top of these services to 
try and do real time analysis on files. Some have even used these to integrate their honey 
pots to send samples over to collect and gather current and new samples. 
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CHAPTER 8.    COMMERCIAL TOOLS 
As mentioned before, there are many commercial tools that can be purchased to 
help automate the malware analysis process. Many can help speed it up, but there are still 
pros and cons to it. A researcher after learning even the basic steps to malware analysis can 
look at output of some of the tools and have a sense on if the tool is giving false positives, 
or false negatives. It can also help a researcher appreciate the amount of time saved by not 
having to do it manually. 
The second piece to take into consideration is cost of the tools. As useful and 
helpful as some of these tools are, a company with 4 employees making $10,000.00 a year 
in profit would not be able to afford an entire suite of commercial grade malware analysis 
tools. For companies like those, a starting point might be to rely on free tools. Open source 
tools might not be the most up to date and easy to support at times, but they have a lower 
entry cost and can help a growing company grow into better tools and support. This will 
help them balance their money invested into security with their risk appetite and their 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability needs. 
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CHAPTER 9.    FUTURE WORK 
With limited time, there is a ton more work on the topic that would have been fun 
to cover and go into more depth on. The goal was to get a common starting place future 
students can use to start analyzing malware samples and apply some of the knowledge 
learned from other courses taken. The main end goal would be to integrate this within 
ISEAGE or flesh out the work enough to have a semester long course on malware analysis, 
assuming there is enough interest. Without taking the 538 reverse engineering class, the 
author is unsure how much crossover there would be between that and a lot of the 
advanced static analysis techniques. This is definitely an area that could expand to tens of 
pages. In addition, screenshots could be added of each tool mentioned that contains a GUI, 
but that could clutter up the paper. Videos were attempted to be captured of the tools with 
audio talking about what was going on, but the author could not get the software to work 
as intended – it either froze on a screen and recorded only audio, or recorded the video 
with no audio. Advanced dynamic analysis could expand quite a bit with all of the 
debugging it goes over as well. In addition to those two main points, there could be a lot 
more information added around malware behavior and have specific examples of each 
added. A section could go over covert malware launching techniques so a researcher 
knows what to look for. There are tons of encryption and encoding techniques such as 
Caesar Cipher, XOR, and base64 that can be used to encode payloads as well as custom 
encoding. There was tons of interesting information on using an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) such as Snort to try and detect some malware information based on network 
signatures. Sikorski’s book also goes over indirection tactics, operations security, and 
safely investigating an attacker. More time could be spent going over packers and 
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unpacking code as that is very important in static analysis. Also, anti-disassembly, anti-
debugging, and anti-virtual machine techniques would be great to cover more in depth as 
most new samples a researcher comes across might not be as straight forward as some of 
the ones provided in the labs and download sites listed above. Shellcode analysis would be 
another topic to go more in depth on for researchers to get a better understanding of what 
they might be looking for and how to find it. In addition to that, I think the section on 
commercial tools and automated malware analysis could be expanded upon to highlight 
some of the pros and cons. Being a tool, there are still some pitfalls to automated analysis 
and tying back to the beginning, there will always be the battle of false positives, false 
negatives, true positives, and true negatives. If a researcher knows how to investigate 
malware manually, it can make it easier to spot anomalies or go further when automated 
tooling has gaps. 
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